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Chapter 5




At the time of writing, it is still unknown how, if at all, the EU Commission’s 
legislative proposal due to be published in the framework if the “insolvency 
initiative”1 in autumn 2016 addresses the harmonisation of the laws of Member 
States on some aspects of directors’ liability. Given the long history of 
harmonisation attempts in this area, raising the idea of harmonisation again would 
not really be surprising. 
In this paper, it is not intended to argue for or against a potential European 
legislation on the personal liability of directors. Its purposes are more limited. It 
aims to present a specific example of legal transfer2 that took place in 2006 when 
Hungary imported the English concept of the liability for “wrongful trading”.3 The 
result of this legal transplant, it is believed, may be instructive for future incentives 
for harmonisation in the field of directors’ liability. 
In the second part of this paper, the initiatives of harmonisation of the directors’ 
liability in the history of the European Communities is summarised. In the third 
part, the function of wrongful trading concept is shortly discussed. In the fourth 
part, a comparative analysis of the main features of the liability for wrongful 
trading both in England and Hungary is presented. Subsequently, the diverging 
1 European Commission, Insolvency Proceedings, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/commercial/
insolvency/index_en.htm (last viewed 25 April 2017). In the meantime, the Commission published its Proposal 
for a Directive on preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency 
of restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures, available at http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/
newsroom/image/document/2016-48/proposal_40046.pdf (last viewed 8 May 2017). Article 18 of the draft 
Directive limits itself to determining some duties of the directors in the vicinity of insolvency.
2 “Legal transfer” or “legal transplant” means unilateral adoption of legal norms from other jurisdictions. See N. 
Garoupa and A. Ogus, “A Strategic Interpretation of Legal Transplants”, (2006) 35 Journal of Legal Studies, p. 341.
3 On the legal transfer of the English provisions on wrongful trading see T. Cseh, “Új hitelezővédelmi jogintézmény 
a magyar társasági törvényben (wrongful trading) [New Legal Institution of Creditor’s Protection in the Hungarian 
Companies Act (Wrongful Trading)]”, (2006) 14 Gazdaság és Jog, pp. 9 ff.
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tendencies in case law is discussed. In the sixth part, an indication of some possible 
reasons why wrongful trading provisions play a more prominent (and different) 
role in Hungary than they do in England is given. As a conclusion, it will be 
attempted to answer the following questions: (i) Do the Hungarian provisions on 
liability for wrongful trading qualify as a “legal transplant”? (ii) Has the adoption 
of the English concept of wrongful trading resulted in “harmonised” or “unified” 
rules4 on directors’ liability for wrongful trading in England and Hungary?
2 Harmonisation Initiatives
The concept of uniform rules in the field of director’s liability throughout the 
Member States emerged early in the history of the European Communities. The 
1970 Preliminary Draft Convention5 envisaged a number of territories where the 
contracting states would have been required to harmonize their substantive laws. 
The personal liability of directors was one of these areas. However, the idea did 
not survive the Preliminary Draft Convention: no similar provision can be found 
in the latter versions of what eventually became the 2000 Insolvency Regulation.6 
The thought emerged again in 2003. The Commission, reflecting to the initiative of 
the “High Level Group”7 proposed8 introducing a wrongful trading rule similar to 
that found in England. However, on the basis of the responses that the Commission 
received,9 the idea was abandoned.10 In 2010 the idea of harmonisation turned 
up again. This time, INSOL Europe, commissioned by the European Parliament, 
4 “Legal harmonization” is a cooperative approach of approximation of laws through setting of objectives and 
targets and let each nation amend their internal law to fulfil the chosen objectives. “Legal unification” is an 
extreme version of harmonization replacing national rules and adopting a unified set of rules chosen at the 
interstate level. See E. Carbonara and F. Parisi, “The Paradox of Legal Harmonization”, (2007) 132 Public 
Choice, p. 368; N. Garoupa and A. Ogus, ibid., p. 343. The dichotomy of harmonisation and unification is 
mirrored at the level of the legislative acts of the EU. „With the use of »directives« member states of the EU 
harmonize their national legal systems by setting common goals and standards. With »regulations« EU countries 
instead agree to replace their respective national laws with a common rule which becomes directly applicable in 
the national systems of all member states.”; see E. Carbonara and F. Parisi, ibid., p. 368.
5 Preliminary Draft of a Convention on Bankruptcy, Winding-Up, Arrangements, Compositions and Similar 
Proceedings. Translation of Commission Document 3.327/1/XIV/70, 4 June 1973. [EU Commission - Working 
Document]’ (1973), Annex 1 Article 1.
6 Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings [2000] OJ L160/1.
7 J. Winter et. al., “Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern Regulatory Framework 
for Company Law in Europe” (2002), available from http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/
report_en.pdf (last viewed 27 July 2016).
8 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Modernising Company Law 
and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union - A Plan to Move Forward COM (2003) 284 Final.
9 Synthesis of the Responses to the Communication of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 
“Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union – A Plan to Move 
Forward” – COM (2003) 284 Final of 21 May 2003.
10 P. J. Wright, “Challenges to the Harmonization of Business Law: Domestic and Cross-Border Insolvency” (2015) 
SSRN Electronic Journal, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2658230 (last viewed 1 August 2016), pp. 
15 ff.
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conducted a report11 identifying some areas of insolvency law where harmonisation 
at EU level seemed to be worthwhile and achievable. The report of INSOL Europe 
concluded that, among other things, directors’ liability could have been subject of 
harmonisation. At a later stage of the legislative process, this aspect of the initiative 
seemed to have evaporated.12 Recently, however, following a communication13 
on a new European approach to business failure and insolvency, the Commission 
adopted a recommendation14 in March 2014. This 2014 Recommendation aims 
at establishing minimum standards for: (i) preventive restructuring procedures 
enabling debtors in financial difficulty to restructure at an early stage with the 
objective of averting insolvency, and (ii) debt discharge, within prescribed 
periods, for honest bankrupt entrepreneurs as one of the steps necessary to provide 
them with a second chance. Neither in these texts nor in the evaluation15 of the 
2014 Recommendation by the Directorate-General Justice & Consumers of the 
European Commission is any direct referral to the intended harmonization of the 
rules on the personal liability of the directors. Notwithstanding, the idea seems to 
keep entertaining the European legislator.16 By the time of the publication of this 
paper it will be known to what extent and how, if at all, the legislative proposals 
of the Commission addresses the issue of directors’ liability.
3 The Function of the Provisions on Wrongful Trading
The principle underlying the wrongful trading concept is the protection of creditors 
in the period of time when the debtor company still operates, but is in a state of 
imminent insolvency. Diverging incentives can be detected in this period of time.17 
The director, acting in the interest of the company, may want to trade the company 
out from the difficult situation, but to do so he needs time, and possibly more credit 
and new obligations. The unsecured creditors may be concerned that the assets of 
the debtor, which are the only coverage for their claims, are melting away and that 
11 INSOL Europe, Harmonisation of Insolvency Law at EU Level, (2010) https://www.insol-europe.org/technical-
content/european-insolvency-regulation (last viewed 1 September 2016).
12 See Report with Recommendations to the Commission on Insolvency Proceedings in the Context of EU Company 
Law (2011/2006(INI) (2011); European Parliament Resolution of 15 November 2011 with recommendations to 
the Commission on insolvency proceedings in the context of EU company law, P7_TA (2011) 0484 2011.
13 A New European Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency COM(2012) 742 Final.
14 Commission Recommendation of 12.3.2014 on a New Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency C(2014) 
1500 final.
15 Evaluation of the Implementation of the Commission Recommendation of 12.3.2015 on a New Approach to 
Business Failure and Insolvency (2015), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/insolvency/02_
evaluation_insolvency_recommendation_en.pdf (last viewed 8 May 2017).
16 See e. g. the reports of the Group of experts on restructuring and insolvency law at http://ec.europa.eu/
transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=3362 (last viewed 8 May 2017).
17 On the incentive structures see G. Spindler, “Trading in the Vicinity of Insolvency”, (2006) 7(1) EBOR, pp. 340. ff.
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they will end up in a position worse than it would have been if formal insolvency 
proceedings had started earlier in time. As Professor Keay put it, 
“[i]f the risk-taking [by the director] pays off, then the shareholders 
will see their wealth maximised, but if it does not, then they have lost 
nothing more; it is the creditors who will bear the cost.”18 
Beyond this, the interest of the employees and the wider public is, generally, to 
save the company or at least the business as going concern. The secured creditors 
normally want their security interests to retain their value, etc. 
Directors are among the key players in the situation when the company is on 
the verge of insolvency. They may just throw in the towel, stop trading and file 
an application for winding up (insolvent liquidation). They may file for formal 
insolvency proceedings designed for reorganisation of the company or rescuing the 
business. Alternatively, they may continue operations and try to trade the company 
out of its difficulties. Should the latter option be chosen, there is little to protect the 
interests of the creditors of the struggling company. 
Two main strategies appear to exist in Europe when dealing with the protection 
of creditors’ interests in the vicinity of insolvency: the “duty to file” strategy and 
the “wrongful trading” strategy. The reports drafted by the London School of 
Economics19 and more recently by the team of University of Leeds20 give a detailed 
account on these strategies. 
The duty to file strategy is more common in Europe. The majority of the member 
states21 of the EU expect the directors to file for insolvency within a certain period 
of time after the insolvency (on cash-flow or balance sheet basis) occurs. Should 
the director fail to comply with that rules then he may be liable for the damage 
caused to the creditors while delaying the insolvency. Apparently, this concept 
puts the emphasis on the formal insolvency proceedings and leaves less room for 
either a potential “trade out” by the debtor company or informal rescue strategies. 
18 A. Keay, “Wrongful Trading and the Liability of Company Directors: A Theoretical Perspective”, (2005) 25 
Legal Studies 434.
19 C. Gerner-Beuerle et. al., “Study on Directors’ Duties and Liability”, (the “London Report”), (2013, London), pp. 
xiv, 208 ff. 
20 Gerard McCormack et. al., “Study on a New Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency – Comparative Legal 
Analysis of the Member States’ Relevant Provisions and Practices” (the “Leeds Report”), (2016), 48 ff.
21 E.g. Germany, France, Austria, Belgium, Poland, Spain, Portugal etc. For more details, see the London and Leeds 
Reports, above notes 19 and 20.
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A minority group of the member states22 incentivise directors to respect the interest 
of the creditors by imposing special – and personal – liability for diminution of 
assets in the period of the approaching insolvency. Following the English example, 
this can be called the “wrongful trading” strategy. As we are going to see below, 
the basis of the liability in the English law is that the director continues operating 
the company whilst he knows or should know that there is no reasonable prospect 
of avoiding an insolvent winding-up. The wrongful trading strategy indicates a 
more flexible approach where there is much more room to try to trade out of the 
difficulties by continuing operations or attempting to rescue the company through 
informal agreements with (some of) the creditors. However, because the apparent 
victims of failed behind-the-door rescue attempts are creditors, their interests are 
protected by special rules making directors liable for losses suffered by the debtor 
in the vicinity of insolvency. 
4 Wrongful Trading in England and Hungary
4.1 The Legal Transplant to Hungary
In England the liability for wrongful trading was introduced23 in the 1986 
Insolvency Act (IA) in addition to other existing civil remedies, first of all the 
provisions on fraudulent trading and misfeasance.24 By contrast, virtually no civil 
law protection was available in Hungary for creditors vis-à-vis the directors of 
the insolvent company prior to 2006.25 As long as the company was not formally 
insolvent (no insolvency proceedings were opened) in most cases directors were 
free to operate the debtor company without any relevant restrictions. Even if the 
management activity of the director resulted in the increase of the net deficiency of 
22 E.g. the U.K., Ireland, Malta, Cyprus, Hungary. For more details, the London and Leeds Reports, above notes 19 
and 20. Of course, the two strategies may be combined: e.g. under certain circumstances Hungarian companies 
are required to file for insolvency, see § 3:189 and § 3:270, Act V of 2013 on the Civil Code (the “Civil Code”). 
23 On the background, aims, rationale of the liability for wrongful trading in comparative context see A. Keay, 
Company Directors’ Responsibilities to Creditors (2007, Routledge-Cavendish, London), pp. 73-80.
24 Fraudulent trading is a cause of action which arises if, in the course of winding-up a company, it appears that any 
business of the company has been carried on with intent to defraud creditors of the company or creditors of any 
other person or has been carried on for any fraudulent purpose, see section 213, IA. Misfeasance is a cause of 
action which arises if, in the course of winding-up a company, it appears that a person has misapplied or retained, 
or become accountable for, any money or other property of the company, or has been guilty of any wrongdoing 
or breached their duties of trust (for example, duty to hold something in trust) in relation to the company, see 
section 212, IA. On the number of the cases in England and Wales classified according to the different types of 
actions see P. Walton, “Insolvency Litigation and the Jackson Reforms – An Update” (the “Walton Report”) 
(2016), available at https://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/policy/research_reports/bus_distress_index/
Insolvency_Litigation_and_the_Jackson_Reforms_-_An_Update_April_2016_FINAL.pdf (last viewed 18 April 
2017), pp. 18-19.
25 See 2006. évi VI. törvény indokolása a csődeljárásról, a felszámolási eljárásról és a végelszámolásról szóló 1991. évi 
XLIX. törvény módosításáról [Explanatory note on the Act VI of 2006 amending of the Hungarian Insolvency Act].
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the debtor, that did not typically provoked the personal liability of the executives 
vis-à-vis creditors.26 
What is equally relevant is that even before the import of the wrongful trading 
provisions from England, no efficient “duty to file” rule existed in Hungary. This 
means that Hungary applied none of the main strategies designed for protection of 
the creditor’s interests in the vicinity of the insolvency. In other words, there were 
no efficient rules forcing the directors or shareholders to start formal insolvency 
proceedings within a certain period of time after the company became insolvent, 
virtually nothing prevented directors from continuing to operate long-insolvent 
companies and accumulate further losses to the creditors of the dying company. 
Quite often, legal transplants occur because a legal institution another nation has is 
deemed superior.27 If that is true, the transfer of the liability for wrongful trading 
from the English law to the Hungarian legal system was more than justified. The 
wrongful trading concept had at least two features which were new and superior 
as compared to the Hungarian law. First, the newly adopted provisions established 
the legal basis of the liability of corporate directors directly vis-à-vis the creditors 
of the debtor company. Second, the new concept created an obligation on the side 
of the company directors to take into consideration the interests of the creditors in 
the period of imminent insolvency, i.e. prior to the factual insolvency.28
4.2 The Key Ingredients of Wrongful Trading in English and Hungarian Law
The basic elements of the liability for wrongful trading pursuant to the IA29 and the 
Hungarian Insolvency Act (HIA)30 are, somewhat generalised, as follows: 
26 In fact, a kind of statutory derivative action for compensation and some judge-made remedies were available; see 
below under heading 6 Possible reasons for the diverging case law. 
27 M. Graziadei, “Comparative law as the study of transplants and receptions”, Chapter 13 in M. Reimann and R. 
Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (2006, OUP, Oxford), pp. 457 ff. 
28 In theory at least, wrongful trading rules impose duties on directors already prior to the onset of material 
insolvency. However, as Bachner demonstrated, this is not necessarily the case. In fact, English courts tend to 
establish the starting point of the critical period (thus the beginning of the special duties) at a later stage of the 
agony, when the company is already (cash-flow or balance sheet) insolvent. See Th. Bachner, “Wrongful Trading 
- a New European Model for Creditor Protection ?”, (2004) 5(2) European Business Organization Law Review, 
pp. 296 ff. Similarly, A. Campbell, “Wrongful Trading and Company Rescue Andrew”, (1994) 25 Cambrian L. 
Rev., p. 74.
29 Section 214, IA.
30 § 33/A, Act XLIX of 1991 on Reorganisation Proceedings and Liquidation Proceedings. Note that, to some 
extent, “culpable trading” as a sub-category of the criminal offence “fraudulent insolvency”, § 404(1), Act C of 
2012 on the Hungarian Criminal Code, can be interpreted as a criminal law counterpart of the wrongful trading; 
for an analysis of the interplay between the two remedies see M. Tihanyi, “A vezetői felelősséggel kapcsolatos 
megállapítási per (wrongful trading) lehetséges hatásai a vétkes gazdálkodással elkövetett csődbűncselekmény 
miatt indult büntetőeljárásokra [The possible effects of the declaratory action regarding the liability of the 
directors (wrongful trading) on the criminal proceedings due to fraudulent insolvency committed through culpable 
trading]”, working paper, http://www.mabie.hu/node/2491 last viewed 17 October 2016. 
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• Formal insolvency proceedings31 have been opened against the debtor 
company. If the debtor is able to avoid opening formal insolvency proceedings 
the director will not be liable for wrongful trading. 
• The director knew or should have concluded before the commencement of the 
formal insolvency proceedings that the company would be unable to avoid 
going into insolvent liquidation or administration (in England) or that the 
company is in the state of imminent insolvency (in Hungary). 
• The person affected was, in a wide sense, a director of the company during the 
critical period. 
• The director fails to prove that he took every step he ought to have taken to 
minimise the loss to creditors.
• The continued operation caused loss to the creditors.
Under the subsequent headings a comparative analysis of these ingredients will 
be provided. 
4.3 Similarities between English and Hungarian Wrongful Trading Provisions
4.3.1 The Debtor Goes into Insolvent Liquidation
Both in England and Hungary, precondition to the liability for wrongful trading 
is that insolvent liquidation proceedings32 have been opened against the debtor 
company. This form of liability is per definitionem retrospective. The liability is 
not an end in itself: should the continued trading or rescue turn out to be successful 
and, as a consequence, the company regains solvency, there is no point to penalise 
the director for the – eventually successful – decision to continue business activity 
even in a seemingly hopeless situation. 
4.3.2 The Addressees of the Norm are Directors in a Wide Sense
Section 214 of the IA requires the persons targeted to be directors. First of all, this 
category includes de jure directors, i.e. those who occupy the position of director, 
by whatever name called.33 Also de facto directors are included.34 A de facto 
director is a person who assumes to act as a director. He is held out as a director 
31 In England: winding up or insolvent administration where the insolvency is to be determined on the basis of 
the balance sheet test, see Section 214, IA; Section 246ZB, IA; in Hungary: felszámolási eljárás (liquidation 
proceedings), see § 33/A, HIA.
32 Ibid.
33 Section 251, IA.
34 See Hydrodan (Corby) Ltd (In Liquidation), Re [1994] BCC 161.
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by the company, and claims and purports to be a director, although never actually 
or validly appointed as such.35 Finally, the statute itself provides that the category 
of director includes also shadow directors, too.36 Shadow director, in relation to a 
company, means a person in accordance with whose directions or instructions the 
directors of the company are accustomed to act.37 Millett J. characterised a shadow 
director as someone who: 
“[…] does not claim or purport to act as a director. On the contrary, he 
claims not to be a director. He lurks in the shadows, sheltering behind 
others who, he claims, are the only directors of the company to the 
exclusion of himself.”38
In Hungary, the concept of director refers first of all to de jure directors.39 Beyond 
that, the statute provides that any person who has in fact exercised dominant 
influence on the decision-making mechanisms of the debtor company shall also 
be considered an executive, i.e. subject to liability.40 This category is generally 
mentioned as “shadow directors” in judgements and the literature but the definition 
appears to cover both shadow and de facto directors. By contrast to the English 
statute, the HIA limits the application of the wrongful trading provisions to those 
directors who have been in this position in the period of three years prior to the 
opening of the insolvency proceedings.41 
4.3.3 Exculpation of Directors
The defence to wrongful trading actions is addressed by both the IA and the HIA 
in a rather similar way. Should the director as defendant in the wrongful trading 
litigation be able to prove that he took every step with a view to minimising 
the potential loss to creditors he ought to have taken (in Hungary: that is to be 
expected from persons in such position), then no liability is incurred.42 This is a 
defence to the wrongful trading action thus the burden of proof, principally, lies 
on the director.
35 R. Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (2011, Sweet & Maxwell, London), pp. 641-643.
36 Section 214(7), IA.
37 Section 251, IA.
38 Hydrodan (Corby) Ltd (In Liquidation), Re [1994] BCC 161, at 163.
39 § 3(1)(d), HIA.
40 § 33/A(1), HIA.
41 Ibid.
42 Section 214(3), IA; § 33/A(3), HIA. The HIA adds that the it is expected from the director to prompt the supreme 
body of the debtor company to take action. 
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In Hungary, however, there appears to be some ambiguity regarding the burden 
of proof. On the one hand, the wording of the statute suggests that the claimant 
is expected to prove that the director, when continuing trading, disregarded the 
interests of the creditors.43 On the other hand, the HIA provides that the director 
as defendant who is able to prove to have taken all reasonable measures expected 
from persons in such positions, upon the occurrence of the imminent insolvency so 
as to prevent and mitigate the losses of creditors, and to prompt the supreme body 
of the debtor’s economic operator to take action, shall not be held responsible. 
Thus, it is not completely clear on the basis of the wording of the statute, which 
party is expected to establish that the director reasonably tried to protect the 
interests of the creditors. The position of the Curia (Highest Court of Hungary) is 
not completely straightforward, either. In one judgement, the judicial body ruled 
that the occurrence and the date of the imminent insolvency, the fact and the extent 
of the increase of the net deficiency and the causal relation between the behaviour 
of the director and the increase of the net deficiency were to be proved by the 
claimant. On the other hand, the defendant director needs to prove that he has 
taken all reasonable measures expected from persons in such positions to prevent 
and mitigate the losses of creditors.44 However, another decision suggests that the 
claimant is required to establish also that the director acted in a way contrary to the 
interests of the creditors during the critical period.45 
4.3.4 Losses during Continued Trading
Section 214 of the IA does not expressly require any loss suffered by the creditors, 
but it is well-established in case law that the continued trading should make the 
company’s position worse, so that it has less money available to pay creditors, 
rather than to leaving the company’s position at the same level.46 Importantly, 
43 Before 15 March 2014 the statute expected to establish that the director failed to act on the basis of the priority 
of the creditors’ interests. Since, the statute has expected directors to take into consideration the interests of the 
creditors, thus there is no clear priority order. However, the changing in the wording of the statute may have no 
effect on the case law, see A. Csőke, “A vezető tisztségviselő felelőssége fizetésképtelenség és felszámolás esetén 
[Liability of executives in the context of insolvency and liquidation]”, in Z. Csehi and M. Szabó (eds), A vezető 
tisztségviselő felelőssége [Liability of the executives] (2015, Wolters Kluwer, Budapest) p. 142.
44 Legfelsőbb Bíróság Gfv.X.30.047/2011/3. cf. A Kúria Polgári Kollégiuma Joggyakorlat-elemző Csoport [Civil 
Department of the Curia, Expert Group Analysing the Case Law], “A vezető tisztségviselők hitelezőkkel 
szembeni felelőssége« tárgykörben felállított joggyakorlat-elemző csoport összefoglaló véleménye (A Kúria 
Polgári Kollégiuma által 2017. február 6-án elfogadott összefoglaló vélemény) [Summary Opinion of the Expert 
Group on the Subject of »the Liability of the Executives vis-à-vis the Creditors” (Summary Opinion approved 
by the Civil Department of the Curia on 6 February 2017] [2016.El.II.JGY.G.2.] (the “Summary Opinion”), 
available at http://lb.hu/sites/default/files/joggyak/osszefoglalo_velemeny_6.pdf (last viewed 12 February 2017); 
the Summary Opinion appears to share this view, pp. 25-27, 31-32.
45 Kúria Gfv.VII.30.303/2013/6.
46 Re Continental Assurance plc [2001] BPIR 733 at paragraph 9 of Annex B; Ralls Builders [2016] EWHC 243 
(Ch) at paragraph 241.
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English provisions on wrongful trading seem to focus merely on the general body 
of the creditors: form the point of view of the wrongful trading prohibition, it is 
not relevant if some creditors are paid fully during the period of continued trading 
while others end up receiving nothing due to payments made to other creditors.47 
What matters is the overall debt position of the company: as long as the overall 
position does not worsen during the critical period, no loss of assets occurs for the 
purposes of wrongful trading. 
The HIA expressly provides48 that some kind of loss is required to activate 
wrongful trading liability: either the debtor’s assets have diminished, or the director 
obstructed full satisfaction for the creditors’ claims, or has neglected to carry out 
the cleaning up of environmental damages. However, in order to trigger this type 
of liability the director must disregard the creditors’ interests in consequence of 
which the losses occur. In other words, even if the asset pool diminishes during 
the critical period that does not automatically result in the liability of the director. 
Some additional element, typically a fraudulent or grossly negligent act of the 
director, is required.49
Note that case law appears to be rather divided as to whether payments to selected 
creditors diminishing the asset pool of the company and decreasing the shares to be 
paid to the remaining creditors is contrary to the prohibition of wrongful trading. 
This question will be analysed below.50 
4.3.5 The Quantitative Limit of the Compensation 
The IA simply provides that the court may declare that the director is to be liable 
to make such contribution (if any) to the company’s assets as the court thinks 
proper.51 These are very wide words of discretion and, as Knox J. stated, it would 
be undesirable to seek to spell out limits on that discretion.52 Still, the principle is 
that the contribution to the assets in which the company’s creditors will share in 
the liquidation should reflect (and compensate for) the loss which has been caused 
to those creditors by the carrying on of the business when the insolvent liquidation 
could not be avoided.53
47 Re Continental Assurance plc [2001] BPIR 733 at paragraph 8 of Annex B; Ralls Builders [2016] EWHC 243 
(Ch) at paragraphs 239-240.
48 § 33/A(1), HIA.
49 BDT2016 3499 (Debreceni Ítélőtábla Gf. IV. 30 369/2015/6).
50 See below under the heading 4.5.2 Which creditors can be lawfully paid off during the critical period?
51 Section 214(1), IA.
52 Produce Marketing Consortium (In Liquidation) Ltd, Re (No2) [1989] 5 BCC 569, at 597-598.
53 Morphitis v Bernasconi [2003] EWCA Civ 289, at paragraph 55 (in relation to fraudulent trading).
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In Hungary, the established principle is that the upper limit of the liability for 
wrongful trading is the amount by which the assets of the debtor have diminished 
during the critical period, as long as this is attributable to the director.54 
4.4 The Differences
4.4.1 What should the Director Foresee?
Pursuant to the English statute, what the director knew or ought to have concluded 
is that there was no reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation or 
insolvent administration.55 Once the director first gains this “deemed knowledge”56, 
the critical period begins. For the purposes of this provision, insolvent liquidation 
or administration means that the assets are insufficient for the payment of debts 
and other liabilities and the expenses of the winding up or those of administration 
(balance-sheet test).57 The statute provides for both objective and subjective tests 
regarding the directors. The focus of the objective test is what should be known 
or concluded by a reasonably diligent person having the general knowledge, skill, 
and experience that may reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the same 
functions as are carried out by that director in relation to the company. Then, 
the subjective test focuses on the what should be known or concluded by this 
reasonably diligent person with the general knowledge, skill, and experience that 
the director in question (i.e. the defendant of the wrongful trading litigation) has. 
It is crucial to emphasise that the focus is not on insolvent trading but on the 
question of whether there is a reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation. 
Insolvent trading in itself does not give rise to wrongful trading.58 As Snowden J. 
put it, 
“[i]t is important to note that the fact that a company is insolvent 
(on a balance sheet or cash-flow basis) and carries on trading does 
not mean that a director – even one with knowledge of that fact — 
will be liable for wrongful trading if the company fails to survive. 
Many companies show a balance-sheet deficit from time to time, but 
nevertheless have every real prospect of trading out of that position 
or otherwise recovering from the deficiency and thereby avoiding an 
insolvent liquidation […]. Likewise, trading companies often suffer 
54 Legfelsőbb Bíróság Gfv.X.30.047/2011/3.; Debreceni Ítélőtábla Gf.III.30.387/2012/5.; Summary Opinion, above 
note 44, p. 23.
55 Section 214(2)(b), IA and Section 246ZB(2)(b), IA.
56 Goode, above note 35, p. 670.
57 Section 214(6), IA and Section 246ZB(6), IA.
58 See Brooks v Armstrong [2015] EWHC 2289 (Ch).
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cashflow difficulties and fail to pay their creditors on time, but are 
able to overcome that cash-flow insolvency by (for example) selling 
an asset or raising external finance on the security of their assets.”59 
What triggers the liability is not the factual insolvency of the debtor but rather 
“the type of situation […] where the director has been held to have had no rational 
basis for believing that the event that they hoped would save the company would 
come about.”60 To sum up, the critical period does not begin just because the 
debtors is insolvent: as long as there is reasonable prospect to trade the company 
out of the difficulties, the threat of wrongful trading does not emerge, even if 
the director knows about the insolvency and even if the continued trading in the 
period of insolvency results in loss to the creditors. English courts tend not to place 
undue emphasis on hindsight and avoid the danger of assuming that what has in 
fact happened was always bound to happen and was apparent.61 As Lewison J 
expressed in so graphic terms,
“[o]f course, it is easy with hindsight to conclude that mistakes were 
made. An insolvent liquidation will almost always result from one 
or more mistakes. But picking over the bones of a dead company in 
a courtroom is not always fair to those who struggled to keep going 
in the reasonable (but ultimately misplaced) hope that things would 
get better.”62
In Hungary, the critical period begins with the occurrence of imminent insolvency. 
Pursuant to the legal definition, imminent insolvency starts when the directors 
were or should have been reasonably able to foresee that the debtor company 
would not be able to satisfy its liabilities when due63 (cash-flow test). In other 
words, as long as the director knows or should foresee that the debtor is cash-flow 
insolvent he is exposed to the liability for wrongful trading if further elements of 
the liability are present. The Curia found that 
“[r]egarding the occurrence of the imminent insolvency the relevant 
question is whether the debtor is able to settle its debts when due. If 
the debtor is unable to do so because it has neither liquid assets nor 
59 Ralls Builders [2016] EWHC 243 (Ch) at paragraph 168.
60 Ibid. at paragraph 174.
61 Sherborne Associates Ltd, Re [1995] BCC 40 at 54; Brian D Pierson (Contractors) Ltd, Re [1999] BCC 26 at 
50; Hawkes Hill Publishing Co Ltd (In Liquidation), Re [2007] BCC 937 at paragraph 47; Ralls Builders [2016] 
EWHC 243 (Ch) at paragraph 173.
62 Hawkes Hill Publishing Co Ltd (In Liquidation), Re [2007] BCC 937 at paragraph 47.
63 § 33/A(1), HIA. Further, see Summary Opinion, above note 44, pp. 20-21; A. Csőke, “A fizetésképtelenséggel 
fenyegető helyzet [The imminent insolvency]”, (2016) (Annex No 2 to the Summary Opinion), pp. 66-70. 
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credit to settle its debts and it is unable to agree with its creditors on a 
different kind of performance or adjustment of the due date then the 
imminent insolvency occurs even if the other assets of the debtor […] 
exceeds the amount of debts.”64 
When applying the rather rigid cash-flow test, it appears that the hope in realising 
some uncertain incomes in the future is insufficient to be shielded from imminent 
insolvency.65 László Juhász, a Hungarian senior judge noted, regarding the rather 
rigid notion of imminent insolvency, that: 
“[h]owever difficult it is to say, it is a fact that a significant number 
of enterprises operating in Hungary need to face with the fact on a 
daily basis that they will not be able to pay off their debts when due 
if they are unable to collect their receivables. The executives should 
realise that in such situations they are acting in the state of imminent 
insolvency even if [the debtor] has significant assets […].”66 
In several cases, Hungarian courts apply the current ratio test or even the quick 
ratio test to determine the cash-flow situation of the company.67 The current ratio 
is a basic indicator calculated by dividing total current assets by total current 
liabilities; the quick ratio, by contrast, takes into account the most liquid current 
assets: it is calculated by adding cash and equivalents, marketable investments, 
and accounts receivables, and dividing that sum by current liabilities. Although the 
wording of the HIA (“were or should have been reasonably able to foresee”) seems 
to suggest that, similar to the English provisions, both an objective and subjective 
test applies, the Curia ruled that
“[t]he occurrence of the imminent insolvency is to be examined 
from the point of view of the knowledge of the director, i.e. of those 
circumstances he has been able to recognise.”68 
To sum up, the difference between the English and Hungarian approach is of 
paramount importance: While an English director is safe from wrongful trading 
liability as long as there is reasonable prospect to avoid insolvent liquidation, his 
64 BH2014. 188. (Kúria Gfv. VII. 30.247/2013.); Kúria Gfv.VII.30.265/2015/4.
65 Fővárosi Ítélőtábla 15.Gf.40.043/2015/5/II.
66 L. Juhász, A Magyar fizetésképtelenségi jog kézikönyve [Textbook on the Hungarian insolvency law] (2014, 
Novotni Kiadó, Miskolc) [electronic edition] p. 484.
67 Fővárosi Ítélőtábla 12.Gf.40.469/2013/5.; Fővárosi Ítélőtábla 12.Gf.40.679/2015/5-II.; Fővárosi Ítélőtábla 
12.Gf.40.013/2015/6-II. See also Csőke, above note 63, pp. 67-69. For an analysis of the methods of examination 
of the imminent insolvency see S. Fónagy, “A Fizetésképtelenséggel fenyegető helyzet megítélése [Assessment 
of the imminent insolvency”, (2015) 23 Gazdaság és Jog, pp. 16 ff.
68 BH2014. 188. (Kúria Gfv. VII. 30.247/2013).
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Hungarian counterpart is exposed to personal liability once and as long as the 
debtor company is cash-flow insolvent. Most probably this provision radically 
increases the number of the potential defendants in Hungary.69 
4.4.2 Who initiates the wrongful trading litigation and benefits from it?
The IA reserves the power for liquidators and administrators to claim against 
directors for wrongful trading.70 Should the court approve the claim the director 
is declared to be liable to make a contribution to the company’s assets. The 
contribution serves the purpose of making a distribution to the unsecured creditors, 
and is therefore not available for a charge holder.71 
In Hungary, the legislator followed a different path. For some reasons, the legislator 
designed the rules so that the court cannot oblige the director to contribute to 
the asset pool of the debtor company. Instead, a peculiar two-level litigation has 
been introduced. In the first phase, after the opening but before the closing of 
the insolvency proceedings, a declaratory action should be brought against the 
former director. This claim is available for both the liquidator and any creditors. 
The litigation is declaratory in nature. It is aimed at establishing the liability and 
the amount of the diminution of assets caused by the continuation of the business 
activity during the critical period of imminent insolvency.72 No performance 
may be sought in this proceeding. Then, in a second step, after the closing of the 
insolvency proceedings, assuming that the assets of the debtor do not or only partly 
cover the creditors’ claims (so in virtually all cases), the creditors, but not the 
liquidator anymore, may bring an action for performance.73 In this second phase 
of the litigation the court, if approving the claim, orders the former director to 
compensate those creditors on pro rata basis who initiated this second litigation. 
The maximum of the compensation to be shared among those creditors amounts to 
the net deficiency accumulated during the critical period as established by the court 
in the first phase of the litigation. One of the inexplicable peculiarities of the rules 
is that the second litigation may be initiated by any creditors, i.e. also by those who 
did not even participate in the first litigation. The root of the problem is that – for an 
unknown reason – the statute does not require the defendant director to contribute 
69 See below under the heading 6 Possible reasons for the diverging case law.
70 Section 214(1), IA and 246ZB(1), IA.
71 Re Oasis Merchandising Services Limited [1998] Ch 170; Ralls Builders [2016] EWHC 243 (Ch) at paragraph 
235.
72 1/2013. (II. 28.) Polgári jogegységi határozat. See A. Csőke, “A vezető tisztségviselő felelőssége [Liability of the 
executive]”, in A. Csőke, E. Lettner and Cs. Juhász, Nagykommentár a csődeljárásról és a felszámolási eljárásról 
szóló 1991. évi XLIX. törvényhez [Comprehensive Commentary on the Insolvency Act] (2015, Wolters Kluwer, 
Budapest) [electronic edition], at § 33/A.
73 § 33/A(6), HIA. See also 1/2013. (II. 28.) Polgári jogegységi határozat [Civil uniformity decision].
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to the assets of the debtor company.74 Instead, the claimants are free to enforce 
their claims on a quasi-individual basis in the second stage of the litigation. This 
appears to be contradictory to the principle of collective insolvency proceedings. 
Note that the legislator has recently eased the strict separation of the two stages of 
litigation by enabling the claimants to request performance during the insolvency 
proceedings if, according to the interim financial statement, the debtor’s assets are 
insufficient to cover the creditors’ claims.75
4.4.3 Statutory Presumption
In Hungary, a statutory presumption assists the claimant in several cases.76 The 
violation of the interests of the creditors is presumed if the director, failing to 
comply with the law, did not deposit and publish the debtor’s annual accounts 
prior to the opening of liquidation proceedings and/or breached his obligation to 
cooperate with the liquidator by providing him with the relevant information and 
documentation. There are some questions regarding this provision. First, the rule 
apparently fails to determine the length of the period before the opening of the 
liquidation proceedings concerning which the failure to deposit and publish the 
annual accounts is taken into consideration. Secondly and more importantly, there 
is some uncertainty in the case law regarding the scope of the presumption. The 
position of the Curia is that, if the claimant proved the occurrence and beginning 
of the imminent insolvency and the increasing of the net deficiency in the critical 
period then, should the statutory presumption be applied, it is presumed that the 
director neglected the interests of the creditors and this is in causal relation with the 
losses to the creditors.77 Others suggest that the scope of the presumption is much 
wider and extends to the occurrence of the imminent insolvency and the increase 
of the net deficiency during the critical period.78
The statutory presumption does not operate regarding shadow directors.79
4.4.4 Majority Shareholder as ex lege Guarantor 
The concept of lifting the corporate veil, i.e. ignoring the separate legal personality 
of the company thereby imposing personal liability on shareholders, is recognised, 
74 Csőke, above note 72, at § 33/A.
75 § 33/A(7), HIA.
76 § 33/A(3), HIA. cf Summary Opinion, above note 44, pp 22-25; P. Lakatos, “A vezető tisztségviselő felelőssége 
vélelmének fennállásával kapcsolatos kérdések [Questions regarding the Statutory Presumption of the Liability 
of the Executives]” (undated) (Annex No 5 to the Summary Opinion), pp. 80-84.
77 Kúria Gfv.VII.30.024/2015/4; Kúria Gfv.VII.30.059/2015/5.
78 M. Dzsula, “A vezető tisztségviselő felelősségével kapcsolatos jogalkalmazási problémák II. [Issues regarding 
application of law relating to the liability of executives II.]” (2013) 23(7) Céghírnök, p. 9. 
79 ÍH 2012.91. (Fővárosi Ítélőtábla 14.Gf.40.493/2011/4)
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although it plays a minor role, in England.80 In Hungary, this concept enjoys a 
wider recognition and shareholders need to consider a number of statutory 
provisions making them personally liable vis-à-vis the creditors of the insolvent 
company.81 What is common in these actions is that they focus on the shareholders 
of the debtor company.
By contrast, the liability for wrongful trading is generally reserved for directors of 
the debtor company, even if the term “director” is to be construed in a wide sense: 
beyond de jure directors, it includes de facto and shadow directors. Actually, the 
term “shadow director” is so widely drafted both in the English and the Hungarian 
statutes that it may cover also controlling shareholders – assuming, of course, 
that they interfere in the management of the company in a way that verifies 
this qualification.82
One of the peculiar characteristic of the Hungarian legislation is that, in an indirect 
but unambiguous way, it puts the majority shareholder of the debtor company to 
the position of a “statutory surety” (guarantor) of the director regarding the liability 
for wrongful trading even if that majority shareholder does not fall within the 
category of shadow director. The essence of the provision83 is that the claimants 
of the declaratory action, i.e. the first litigation,84 may request the court to order 
the director as defendant to provide financial security for the case if – typically 
later, in the second litigation (action for performance)85 – the court finds the 
director liable for wrongful trading and obliges him to pay compensation to the 
creditors on pro rata basis. Should the judgement ordering the former director to 
pay compensation to the creditors turn out to be unenforceable, e.g. because the 
director is impecunious, then the creditors as claimants will be able to recover 
their claims approved by the court from the financial security. Up to this point the 
system is consistent, if not really efficient. However, the statute goes further. The 
majority shareholder of the debtor company shall be deemed, by force of law, as 
a guarantor regarding the financial security if the latter cannot be recovered from 
the director. Practically, by this provision the legislator expanded the liability for 
wrongful trading, originally targeting the managers of the company, to the majority 
shareholders. Thereby, beyond providing an apparent benefit to the creditors, the 
80 P. L. Davies, S. Worthington and E. Micheler, Principles of Modern Company Law (2016, Sweet & Maxwell, 
London) pp. 191-206.
81 See § 3:2(2) and § 3:324. § (3, Civil Code; § 63(2) and § 63/, HIA; § 118/A, Act V of 2006 on Public Company 
Information, Company Registration and Solvent Winding-up Proceedings.
82 Regarding the IA see Goode, above note 35, p. 668.
83 § 33/A(2), HIA.
84 See above under the heading 4.4.2 Who initiates the wrongful trading litigation and benefits from it?
85 Ibid.
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legislator virtually eliminated the, otherwise very real, conflict of interests between 
directors and the majority shareholders arising from the threat of liability for 
wrongful trading. 
4.4.5 Professional Advisers are not Statutorily Exempted from the Category of 
Shadow Director
The IA provides that a person is not deemed a shadow director by reason only that 
the directors act on advice given by that person in a professional capacity.86 Of 
course, if they cross the line and move from advising to instructing this exemption 
will not protect them.87 
No similar exemption exists in the Hungarian statute. The widely drafted 
definition88 of shadow director may, in theory, include those who advised the 
debtor company in a professional capacity (e.g. solicitor or accountant). However, 
there are no apparent cases in which Hungarian courts established the liability of 
a professional adviser as shadow director. 
Another aspect of the involvement of professional advisers is whether that has 
any effect on the liability of the director. In England, courts have been prepared 
to place weight upon the evidence as to whether the directors took professional 
advice, and if so, what that advice was.89 It appears that asking for and following 
the advice of an informed professional is a strong defence against wrongful trading 
claims.90 No similar case law appears to exist in Hungary. 
4.5 Some further Critical Questions
4.5.1 The Question of “New Creditors”
One of the crucial, partially ethical, question emerging when a company operates 
on the verge of insolvency is the treatment of “new creditors”. When a company 
continues operating after the critical date,91 normally new debts incur. This is 
because, in order to generate revenues and performing its obligations vis-à-vis 
86 Section 251, IA.
87 L. Doyle and A. Keay (eds.), Insolvency Legislation: Annotations and Commentary (2016, Jordan Publishing, 
Bristol) p. 380.
88 § 33/A(1), HIA.
89 Hawkes Hill Publishing Co Ltd (In Liquidation), Re [2007] BCC 937 az paragraph 43; Continental Assurance 
Company of London plc [2007] 2 BCLC 287 at paragraph 108; Ralls Builders [2016] EWHC 243 (Ch) at 
paragraph 176-177, 206.
90 F. Oditah, “Wrongful trading” (1990) Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law, p. 208.
91 In England when they know or should conclude that there no reasonable prospect to avoid insolvent liquidation 
and in Hungary when the director foresees or should reasonably foresee that the debtor company will not be able 
to satisfy its liabilities when due. See above under the heading 4.4.1 What should the director foresee?
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their partners, the debtor company more often than not needs to purchase material, 
order services, involve sub-contractors, accept new orders, etc. In principle, this 
is not contrary to the obligation of the director to take every step with a view to 
minimising the potential loss to the company’s creditors in the critical period.92 
After all, if the trade out is successful and the company regains its solvency then 
no creditor’s claims remain unpaid. However, in the event of a failure of rescue 
the new creditors, i.e. those whose debts arose during the critical period, find 
themselves in the situation as if they were, typically involuntarily, used to finance 
the attempt to rescue the debtor company at their own risk. Moreover, in several 
cases they have to face the fact that some of the “old creditors” (i.e. those whose 
claim arose prior to the critical period) were simply paid off from the money 
coming from the new creditors. 
Some legal systems, e.g. the German, handles this question differently. When 
applying the German “counterpart” of wrongful trading provisions, the so-called 
“Insolvenzverschleppungshaftung” (liability for delaying insolvency), German 
courts distinguish between old and new creditors. While the former ones receive 
“Quotenschaden” (i.e. the diminution after comparing the hypothetical dividend 
that would have been payable to the creditors at the time when the company should 
have filed for insolvency and the actual dividend expressed as a percentage of the 
nominal claims), the new creditors generally retrieve their total losses which are 
not to be claimed by the liquidator.93 In other words, when considering the damage 
has been caused by the delay in the commencement of the insolvency, German law 
focuses on the position of the creditors rather than the position of the company.94
By contrast, section 214 of the IA apparently looks at the loss suffered by the 
company, and consequently, by the general body of creditors, rather than the 
individual creditors. As Snowden J explained: 
“Standing back, whatever other criticisms can be made of the manner 
in which the Directors conducted the business of the Company [in 
the critical period], I think it is entirely plausible that such continued 
activity did not cause loss to the Company overall or worsen the 
position of the creditors as a whole [emphasis added]. The real sin of 
the Directors, so far as the unsecured creditors left in the liquidation 
are concerned, is the manner in which the continued trading facilitated 
the repayment of the Bank and some existing creditors whilst leaving 
92 Section 214(3), IA; § 33/A(3), HIA.
93 Bachner, above note 28, 311 ff; Spindler, above note 17, p. 47.
94 Ibid, p. 311.
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new creditors unpaid. I have already indicated my view that this is 
not something that the Directors ought to have permitted to occur, 
but for the reasons I have explained, I cannot see that it justifies a 
contribution to be made to the assets of the Company under section 
214(1). That may be thought to be a shortcoming in the structure of 
section 214 [the provision on wrongful trading], but I do not think it 
is one that I can remedy: any such change would be for Parliament.”95
Having said that, this does not mean that the directors should irresponsibly use 
the new creditor’s means to help the company survive or pay off some other 
due debts. Namely, such behaviour may trigger liability for fraudulent trading 
pursuant to section 213 IA.96 In general, fraudulent trading is committed if the 
company obtains new credit, knowing it will be unable to repay it when due in 
order to pay off existing creditors.97 The threshold of proof, of course, is higher 
as compared to that of wrongful trading. Namely, in order that the liability for 
fraudulent trading be established it is necessary to prove that the business has 
been carried out with intent to defraud creditors, that the defendant participated in 
carrying on the business, and that the defendant did so with knowledge about the 
fraudulent intention. 
As with the English provisions, the Hungarian subspecies of wrongful trading 
also focuses on the interest of the general body of the creditors. The monetary 
limit of the compensation is the decrease of the asset pool of the debtor company 
in the period of the imminent insolvency.98 Consequently, if there is no loss, there 
is no liability. Apparently, the current provisions of the liability for wrongful 
trading, like the English statute, are not designed to differentiate between “old” 
and “new” creditors. 
But again, as with the English provisions, there is some protection for those 
creditors whose claims arose when there was virtually no chance that the debtor 
would be able to pay them off. Although there is no statutory rule in Hungary 
corresponding to English civil remedy of fraudulent trading, fraud as a general 
criminal offence appears to cover this kind of behaviour.99
95 Ralls Builders [2016] EWHC 243 (Ch) at paragraph 279.
96 Regarding the criminal liability for fraudulent trading see Section 993, Companies Act.
97 R v Grantham [1984] QB 675; Goode, above note 35, p. 661-662. 
98 See above under the heading 4.3.5 The quantitative limit of the compensation.
99 BH2011. 58. (Legf. Bír. Bfv. II. 1040/2009.)
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4.5.2 Which Creditors can be Lawfully Paid off During the Critical Period?
We have seen before that section 214 of the IA is basically neutral regarding 
payment to selected creditors. What matters is the overall position of the company 
rather than the position of singular creditors. Similarly, fraudulent trading pursuant 
to section 213 of the IA is generally not implicated by payment of preferences. The 
mere fact of preferring one creditor will not in itself qualify as fraudulent trading.100 
Of course, other legal grounds for liability like the provisions on preferences101 and 
misfeasance102 may come into play. 
In Hungary, there is a degree of uncertainty as to what constitutes the diminution of 
assets and which payments by the debtor, diminishing the asset pool, are deemed 
lawful. In several judgements, the question of the increase of the deficiency (i.e. 
the worsening of the position of the general body of creditors) on the one hand 
and that of the lawfulness of such increase on the other hand are not handled as 
separate questions. The following main directions can be distilled from case law.
The majority opinion, confirmed by the Curia suggests that wrongful trading 
provisions are designed to protect the assets of the debtor company.103 
Consequently, if the asset pool diminishes in the critical period, even if through 
paying off some legitimate debts to the creditors, this amounts to the diminution of 
assets for the purposes of the wrongful trading provisions. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that such diminution is unlawful, as we are going to see below. 
A minority of the decisions concluded that in the event both the assets and the 
liabilities decreases, e.g. by paying off one or more legitimate creditors with due 
claims, this is not a diminution of assets for the purposes of wrongful trading.104
As to the question asking which creditors may lawfully be paid off in the critical 
period, even if at the price of diminishing the asset pool, diverging answers can 
be found in the case law. At the one end of the scale there are a few judgements 
concluding that no payment is allowed which diminishes the assets of the debtor 
company.105 At the other end of the scale are those decisions ruling that payments 
100 Sarflax Ltd, Re [1979] Ch 592. 
101 Section 239, IA.
102 Section 212, IA; Liquidator of West Mercia Safetywear Ltd v Dodd [1988] 4 B.C.C. 30; Goode, above note 35, 
652 f.
103 Kúria Gfv.VII.30.024/2015/4., Kúria Gfv.VII.30.265/2015/4., BH2016. 179. (Kúria Gfv. VII. 30.254/2015.), ÍH 
2013.37. (Szegedi Ítélőtábla Gf. I. 30.344/2011.), Fővárosi Ítélőtábla 12.Gf.40.343/2012/7., Fővárosi Ítélőtábla 
15.Gf.40.043/2015/5/II.
104 E.g. Debreceni Ítélőtábla Gf.III.30.387/2012/5; Pécsi Ítélőtábla Gf.IV.40.022/2015/4; Szegedi Ítélőtábla 
Gf.IV.30.105/2013/5.
105 Kúria Gfv.VII.30.265/2015/4; Legfelsőbb Bíróság Gfv.IX.30.432/2010/4.
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to legitimate creditors, including shareholders, do not violate the prohibition 
of wrongful trading,106 as long as both the assets and liabilities diminish in 
equivalent proportions.107
What appears to be the majority opinion is that payments to related persons (first of 
all to the shareholders of the debtor company) are not acceptable.108 A number of 
judgements agree that from the point of view of the liability for wrongful trading 
a distinction must be made between outsider creditors on the one hand and the 
shareholders of the company. The repayment of the shareholder’s loan may not 
frustrate the settlement of claims belonging to outsider third party creditors. Some 
judgements and authors have emphasised that a director, when deciding about 
payments to be performed during the critical period, should make sure that the 
specific payment serves the restoring of the solvency, the enabling of the continued 
operation, thus the interests of the general body of the creditors.109 
Hungarian courts appear to accept that payments to those secured creditors 
whose claim would be covered by the assets anyway in a hypothetical insolvent 
liquidation scenario does not trigger liability for wrongful trading.110 
As with the English law, the fact that some payments to selected creditors do not 
constitute wrongful trading liability does not mean that the payment in question 
would not be targeted by provisions on preferences.111
4.5.3 “Pull the Plug” Scenario
Sometimes a decision whether to continue the operation or to shut down the 
business can be difficult indeed. This is the situation if the company is insolvent 
or is in the state of imminent insolvency, the survival is rather questionable and 
the chances are that, if the attempt to trade out of insolvency turns out to be 
unsuccessful, then the general body of creditors finds itself in a situation worse 
than it would have been if the debtor had filed for insolvency earlier. What are 
directors expected to do in such situation? 
106 But it may well be incompatible with the rules on preferences, see § 40, HIA.
107 Fővárosi Ítélőtábla 12.Gf.40.469/2013/5; Pécsi Ítélőtábla Gf.IV.30.117/2013/8; Pécsi Ítélőtábla 
Gf.IV.40.022/2015/4.
108 Kúria Gfv.VII.30.193/2013/8; Debreceni Ítélőtábla Gf.IV.30.008/2015/5; Szegedi Ítélőtábla Gf.III.30.401/2014/2; 
BDT2014. 3241 (Szegedi Ítélőtábla Gf. I. 30 509/2012); Győri Ítélőtábla Gf.II.20.117/2015/3; BDT2013. 2881 
(Szegedi Ítélőtábla Gf. I. 30 276/2011.). Similarly, Csőke, above note 43, p. 132.
109 BDT2014. 3241 (Szegedi Ítélőtábla Gf. I. 30 509/2012); Győri Ítélőtábla Gf.II.20.117/2015/3; Debreceni 
Ítélőtábla Gf.IV.30.008/2015/5. Similarly, Csőke, above note 43, p. 132.
110 Kúria Gfv.VII.30.040/2012/3; ÍH 2013.37. (Szegedi Ítélőtábla Gf. I. 30.344/2011).
111 See § 40, HIA; BH2016. 179 (Kúria Gfv. VII. 30.254/2015); ÍH 2013.37 (Szegedi Ítélőtábla Gf. I. 30.344/2011); 
Pécsi Ítélőtábla Gf.IV.30.117/2013/8; Szegedi Ítélőtábla Gf.IV.30.105/2013/5.
“Wrongful Trading” in England and Hungary: A Comparative Study
104 Harmonisation of European Insolvency Law
The emblematic sentences of Park J., which sum up the diverging incentives 
influencing the decision of the managers, are worth citing in this regard:
“An overall point which needs to be kept in mind throughout is 
that, whenever a company is in financial trouble and the directors 
have a difficult decision to make whether to close down and go into 
liquidation, or whether instead to trade on and hope to turn the corner, 
they can be in a real and unenviable dilemma. On the other hand, if 
they decide to trade on but things do not work out and the company, 
later rather sooner, goes into liquidation, they may find themselves in 
the situation of the respondents in this case—being sued for wrongful 
trading. On the other hand, if the directors decide to close down 
immediately and cause the company to go into an early liquidation, 
although they are not at risk of being sued for wrongful trading, they 
are at risk of being criticised on other grounds. A decision to close 
down will almost certainly mean that the ensuing liquidation will be 
an insolvent one. Apart from anything else liquidations are expensive 
operations, and in addition debtors are commonly obstructive about 
paying their debts to a company which is in liquidation. Many 
creditors of the company from a time before the liquidation are likely 
to find that their debts do not get paid in full. They will complain 
bitterly that the directors shut down too soon; they will say that the 
directors ought to have had more courage and kept going. If they had 
done, so the complaining creditors will say, the company probably 
would have survived and all of its debts would have been paid. 
Ceasing to trade and liquidating too soon can be stigmatised as the 
cowards’ way out.”112
What appears to be certain in the context of the English law is that there is, of 
course, no obligation to cease operating once the company becomes insolvent, 
even if the situation is so hopeless that there is no prospect of saving the company. 
In this case, the continuation of operations may still diminish the net deficiency 
so that the general body of creditors is better off than it would have been in the 
event of an early filing.113 Even if the continued trading happened to increase the 
net deficiency, the director who tried to save the business may still have some 
chance to rely on the statutory defence by proving that he took every step with a 
112 Re Continental Assurance plc [2001] BPIR 733 at paragraph 281.
113 Ralls Builders [2016] EWHC 243 (Ch) at paragraphs 185, 268-270.
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view to minimising the potential loss to the creditors, assuming it was designed 
appropriately so as to minimise the risk of loss to individual creditors.114
The risks connected to the opposite situation, i.e. when the manager decides to 
stop trading and file for insolvency even though there was still reasonable prospect 
to avoid going into insolvent liquidation, is less clear. As we have seen above, 
Park J. seems to suggest that in this case directors are not at risk of being sued 
for wrongful trading.115 This appears to be logical. Wrongful trading liability is 
attached to the continuation of trading in the critical period, i.e. when the director 
knew or ought to have concluded that insolvent liquidation cannot reasonably be 
avoided. If there is no such critical period or it is very short simply because the 
director filed for insolvency once the situation started to become critical, there 
appears to be no basis for the application of section 214 of the IA. 
In Hungary, the “pull the plug” scenario is sometimes regarded as a safe harbour 
by advisers and directors striving to avoid personal liability for wrongful trading. 
Indeed, while on the one hand wrongful trading provisions do not seem to restrain 
directors from attempting to save debtor companies through continuing operation 
as long as the operation and the associated payments are not contrary to the 
interests of the general body of creditors, on the other hand, those provisions do 
not prohibit or penalise early filing, either. Having said that, directors may be 
liable vis-à-vis the company (thus indirectly to the shareholders and the creditors) 
on a legal basis different116 from wrongful trading if they let the company go into 
insolvent liquidation despite the opportunity to dissolve the company through 
solvent liquidation proceedings.117
5 The Diverging Case Law
Despite the visibility of the wrongful trading concept both in England and abroad, 
section 214 of the IA has not been often used. There have only been a small number 
of reported cases.118 What generally can be said about the case law is that courts 
do not appear prepared to impose liability on directors, and this is particularly so 
if the directors have sought and obtained advice from professionals. Accordingly, 
114 Ibid, at paragraph 245.
115 Goode, above note 35, pp. 667, 673-674 is of the opposite view. 
116 E.g. a derivative claim for compensation brought by the liquidator on behalf of the insolvent debtor company, § 
3:24(1), Civil Code; or a shareholder’s claim for compensation vis-a-vis the director, § 3:117(3), Civil Code.
117 BDT2012. 2782. (Szegedi Ítélőtábla Gf. I. 30 346/2011.)
118 A. Keay and P. Walton, Insolvency Law, Corporate and Personal (2012, Jordan Publishing, Bristol), p. 659.
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in most cases where directors have been found liable they have been found to have 
acted irresponsibly.119 As Park J. summarised:
“Typically they have been cases [where directors have been held to 
be liable] in which the directors closed their eyes to the reality of 
the company’s position, and carried on trading long after it should 
have been obvious to them that the company was insolvent and that 
there was no way out for it. In those cases the directors had been 
irresponsible, and had not made any genuine attempt to grapple with 
the company’s real position.”120
In Produce Marketing,121 the directors ignored the warning of the auditors and 
continued trading. Beyond, the affairs of the debtor were conducted in a way which 
reduced the indebtedness to the bank, to which one of the directors had given a 
guarantee, at the expense of trade creditors. In Re Purpoint,122 the director failed to 
ensure that proper records were kept and that proper cash flow calculations and net 
worth calculations were made, therefore it was impossible to ascertain the extent 
to which the net liabilities were increased by the continuance of the company’s 
trading. In Re Bangla Television,123 instead of causing the company to cease trading, 
the directors caused the company to deal or purportedly trade with its assets so that 
the company parted with £250,000 worth of them for no consideration. 
By contrast, there have been a relatively high number of cases reported in Hungary 
in the recent years. It appears that more than 300 cases reached the courts of appeal, 
most of them after 2010. Taking into consideration the difference in size of the two 
countries, we can say that wrongful trading litigation is much more widespread 
in Hungary than it is in England. Based on the review of the cases, it can be said 
that in Hungary, a successful wrongful trading litigation presupposes an element 
of fraud in a wide sense, the term including preferential payments to affiliated 
entities as well.
Among other things,124 Hungarian courts held directors liable who had repaid 
shareholders’ loans in the critical period while no assets were available for 
119 Morris v Bank of India [2005] EWCA Civ 693 at paragraph 103; ibid, p. 659.; A. Keay, above note 23, p. 130.; 
Doyle and Keay (eds.), above note 87, p. 298.
120 Re Continental Assurance plc [2001] BPIR 733 at paragraph 106.
121 Produce Marketing Consortium (In Liquidation) Ltd, Re (No.2) [1989] 5 BCC 569. 
122 Purpoint Ltd, Re [1991] BCC 121.
123 Bangla Television Ltd (In Liquidation), Re [2009] EWHC 1632 (Ch).
124 On the behaviours of executives normally giving rise to personal liability see Summary Opinion, above note 44, 
pp. 21-23.
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unsecured creditors.125 Also, providing loans to affiliated companies and/or (asset-
less) third parties without any security interests, thereby diminishing the asset pool 
available to the creditors, amounted to wrongful trading.126 Similarly, directing 
payments originally due to the debtor company to another (affiliated) entity in the 
vicinity of insolvency may trigger the director’s personal liability.127 Entering into 
notional contracts in order to dissipate the debtor’s assets128 or a fraudulent transfer 
of real estate for no real consideration to another (affiliated) company129 qualified 
as wrongful trading. Should the director be unable to give an account of the assets 
indicated in the annual accounts he has to be prepared to be subject to wrongful 
trading litigation, too.130 
6 Possible Reasons For Diverging Case Law
As has been shown, there are significant differences in the case law between 
England and Hungary, both in terms of the number and the substance of the cases. 
As to the low number of reported cases in England, the findings of the Leeds 
Report131 are instructive. The Report identified a number of obstacles to enforcement 
vis-à-vis directors who breached their insolvency-related duties.132 In relation to 
the United Kingdom, these obstacles seem to be: impecunious directors, cost of 
litigation, lack of evidence, burden of proof, and lack of funding. The problem of 
funding and the litigation costs as important obstacles are highlighted by other 
authors, as well. Because only office holders (liquidators and administrators) have 
the right to initiate the litigation and no public funding is available, they are rather 
cautious of risking the debtor’s already inadequate assets on litigation unless there 
is a very strong chance of success.133 Possibly, the reforms of 2015 giving office 
125 BH2016. 179 (Kúria Gfv. VII. 30.254/2015); BDT2013. 2881 (Szegedi Ítélőtábla Gf. I. 30 276/2011); Debreceni 
Ítélőtábla Gf.IV.30.008/2015/5; Szegedi Ítélőtábla Gf.III.30.401/2014/2.
126 EBH2011. 2326 (Legf. Bír. Gfv. IX. 30.249/2010); Kúria Gfv.VII.30.253/2014/6; ÍH 2013.76 (Fővárosi Ítélőtábla 
13. Gf. 40.002/2012/15); BDT2010. 2282 (Pécsi Ítélőtábla Gf. II. 30 266/2009/7); BDT2016. 3499. (Debreceni 
Ítélőtábla Gf. IV. 30 369/2015/6).
127 BH2014. 188 (Kúria Gfv. VII. 30.247/2013).
128 BH2012. 101 (Legf. Bír. Gfv. X. 30.361/2010); BH2013. 222 (Kúria Gfv. VII. 30 036/2013).
129 Fővárosi Ítélőtábla 12.Gf.40.013/2015/6-II.
130 Legfelsőbb Bíróság Gfv.IX.30.432/2010/4; BDT2008. 1767 (Szegedi Ítélőtábla: Gf. I. 30.099/2006).
131 Above note 20.
132 Ibid, pp. 62 ff.
133 Davies, Worthington and Micheler, above note 80, pp. 217-218; Keay and Walton, above note 118, pp. 659-660. 
The abolition of the “Jackson exemption” for insolvency in April 2016 is expected to have a negative impact on 
the insolvency litigation in the UK, see Walton Report, above note 24, p. 11. By contrast, the new section 15A of 
the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 creates a new alternative way of director’s liability by giving the 
court a new power to make a compensatory award against a director at the time it makes a disqualification order.
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holders the statutory right to assign wrongful trading claims or the proceeds of 
such action134 will somewhat improve the situation. 
In relation to Hungary, the Leeds Report mentioned all the obstacles identified in 
relation to England plus a time factor. Without calling into question that all of these 
factors may play some role in the initiation of wrongful trading litigation, it must 
be noted that the high number of cases in Hungary seem to suggest the relative 
insignificance of such obstacles. The huge gap in terms of the number of cases 
heard in England and Hungary necessitates some explanation, however.
First of all, the Hungarian wrongful trading litigation is not reserved for office 
holders. By contrast, both the liquidator and any creditor have the right to bring 
actions for a declaration of liability for wrongful trading.135 In reality, a significant 
percentage of the reported cases were commenced by creditors, not infrequently by 
the tax authority.136 The fact that the pool of the claimants is bigger may increase the 
number of cases by itself. Beyond this, in some cases the wide pool of the potential 
claimants, particularly those with “deep pockets” like the tax authority, contributes 
to overcoming obstacles like the lack of funding and the costs of litigation. Also, 
the relatively modest cost of the litigation may be a factor contributing to the 
popularity of this remedy in Hungary.137
Beyond these above points of a somewhat “technical” nature, there are also some 
substantive differences that may potentially explain the high number of cases. In 
this regard two main factors should be referred to. First, as we have seen above, the 
level of knowledge “expected” from directors, i.e. what they could or should have 
been able to foresee, is rather different in Hungary from the English model. While 
in England, in order to activate liability for wrongful trading, it is necessary that the 
director knew or ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable prospect to 
avoid going into insolvent liquidation or administration (on balance sheet basis), 
while in Hungary a much lower level of knowledge suffices: the period of imminent 
insolvency begins when the directors were or should have been reasonably able 
to foresee that the debtor company would not be able to satisfy its liabilities when 
due (on cash-flow basis). As a consequence, this element of the wrongful trading 
materialises frequently. Second, the statutory presumption in Hungary, according 
134 Section 246ZD, IA; Davies, Worthington and Micheler, above note 80, pp. 218.
135 § 33/A(1), HIA.
136 Summary Opinion, above note 44, p. 16; R. Muzsalyi, “A joggyakorlat-elemző csoport által vizsgált ítéletek 
alapján levonható statisztikai következtetések [Statistical Conclusions from the Judgements Analysed by the 
Expert Group]” (2016) (Annex No 9 to the Summary Opinion), pp. 99-104.
137 The stamp duty to be paid for the first instance declaratory action is approx. GBP 100. See §§ 39 and 42, Act 
XCIII of 1990 on Duties; 1/2013. (II. 28.) Polgári jogegységi határozat [Civil uniformity decision].
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to which the violation of the interests of the creditors is presumed if the director has 
not deposited and published the debtor’s annual accounts prior to the opening of 
liquidation proceedings or breached his obligation to cooperate with the liquidator 
and to provide him with the relevant information and documentation, plays an 
important role in a not insignificant number of wrongful trading litigations.138
Looking at the substances of the cases it can be observed that most (if not all) of 
the cases where the courts have established the personal liability for wrongful 
trading involved an element of fraudulence by the director. However, this 
element of fraudulence is to be understood widely: cases in which the defendant 
prioritised affiliated entities or shareholders over outsider creditors seem to suffice 
to trigger the liability for wrongful trading, assuming the further ingredients are 
also present.139 
It appears that the implementation of the wrongful trading provisions in Hungary 
making possible to sue former directors for compensation of the damage caused to 
the creditors of the company during the period of imminent insolvency opened an 
invisible door for lawsuits against directors. This is most probably because prior to 
the implementation of the rules on wrongful trading there were no efficient civil law 
remedies protecting the interests of the creditors in the vicinity of the insolvency.140 
Undoubtedly, liquidators had been (and still are) free to initiate a kind of derivative 
claim for compensation in the right of the insolvent company.141 However, the 
scope of those derivative actions are somewhat different from the wrongful trading 
actions. The prohibition of wrongful trading is designed to protect the interests 
138 E.g. BH2012. 101 (Legf. Bír. Gfv. X. 30.361/2010); Kúria Gfv.VII.30.059/2015/5; Kúria Gfv.VII.30.024/2015/4; 
ÍH 2013.37 (Szegedi Ítélőtábla Gf. I. 30.344/2011); ÍH 2013.76 (Fővárosi Ítélőtábla 13. Gf. 40.002/2012/15); 
BDT2012. 2619. (Szegedi Ítélőtábla Pf. I. 20.498/2010); Fővárosi Ítélőtábla 12.Gf.40.013/2015/6-II; Fővárosi 
Ítélőtábla 15.Gf.40.043/2015/5/II. In around 36% of the cases the statutory presumption applies, see Lakatos, 
above note 76, p. 82.
139 See above under the heading 5 The diverging case law.
140 2006. évi VI. törvény indokolása a csődeljárásról, a felszámolási eljárásról és a végelszámolásról szóló 1991. évi 
XLIX. törvény módosításáról [Statement of reasons given for the Act VI of 2006 amending the HIA]. Having 
said that, in some cases courts have decided to lift the corporate veil on the basis of the general civil law declaring 
that the defendant-directors abused the shield of limited liability. See Szegedi Ítélőtábla Polgári Kollégium 
2/2008 (XII. 4) számú kollégiumi véleményével módosított, egységes szerkezetbe foglalt 1/2005. (VI. 17) számú 
kollégiumi véleménye a jogi személy elkülönült felelősségéről és a felelősség „áttöréséről” [1/2005 (VI. 17) 
opinion of the Regional Court of Appeal Szeged (Civil Division) about the separate liability and the “lifting of 
the corporate veil” as amended and consolidated by 2/2008 (XII. 4) opinion of the same court]; BDT2002. 631 
(Csongrád Megyei Bíróság 1. Gf. 40 298/1999/3); BDT2012. 2707 (Szegedi Ítélőtábla Gf. I. 30 146/2011). Some 
authors argue that this case law is contra legem, see Sz. Patai and S. É. Szabó, “A működő jogi személy elkülönült 
felelősségének áttörése az EDB 2014.11.G3. ítélet tükrében [Lifting of the corporate veil of an operative (i.e. 
non-insolvent) company in the light of decision EDB 2014.11.G3]”, (2016) (3) Polgári Jog [electronic journal]. 
After the entering into force of the new Civil Code this case law appears to be unsustainable, see P. Gárdos and 
L. Vékás (eds), Kommentár a Polgári Törvénykönyvről Szóló 2013. évi V. törvényhez [Commentary on the Civil 
Code] (2014, Wolters Kluwer, Budapest) [electronic edition], Chapter LXIX.
141 § 3:24(1), Civil Code.
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of the creditors by making directors liable for the diminution of the asset pool, 
thus for losses suffered, indirectly, by the unsecured creditors in the period of 
imminent insolvency. By contrast, the derivative action initiated by the liquidator 
on behalf of the company is designed to make the directors liable for losses caused 
to the company itself. In the latter case the fact that the directors disregarded the 
interests of the creditors is irrelevant. Consequently, it is more than questionable 
whether a director following the instructions of the majority shareholder or acting 
in compliance with the resolutions of the shareholder’s meeting could be held 
liable, without the special rules on wrongful trading, for losses suffered by the 
company. E.g. paying off due and lawful shareholder’s loans prior to outsider 
commercial creditors, while this is apparently a violation of the wrongful trading 
rules, it seems to be out of the scope of the derivative compensatory action.142 
7 Some Conclusions
Should the Hungarian legislation on wrongful trading therefore be regarded 
as a legal transplant of its English counterpart? The answer is yes, with some 
reservations. It was the apparent decision of the Hungarian legislature to create 
special rules on director’s liability vis-à-vis creditors in the context of insolvency. 
Both the wording and certain basic ingredients of the Hungarian provisions suggest 
that the Hungarian rules were inspired by the English example. Both provisions 
are intended to protect creditors’ interests in the vicinity of insolvency, the basis 
of the liability is the loss caused to the creditors in the critical period, the starting 
point of the liability, at least in theory, precedes the factual insolvency etc. On the 
other hand, on at least at one crucial point, the Hungarian legislator deviated from 
the English template. In England, the insolvent trading in itself does not trigger 
personal liability. Should the director reasonably believe that the company can 
trade out of difficulties, so that balance sheet insolvency is avoidable, there is no 
liability. By contrast, in Hungary the mere knowledge or anticipated knowledge 
about an, even temporary, cash-flow insolvency is enough for directors to enter 
into the danger zone.
The differences in the case law, first of all in terms of the quantity of cases in 
Hungary appears to be attributable, principally, to the broader pool of the potential 
defendants stemming from the widely formulated statutory provisions regarding 
the critical period, the broader pool of the claimants arising from the legal standing 
142 By contrast, there appear to be misconducts which may trigger either types of liability; see BDT2013. 2897 
(Debreceni Ítélőtábla Gf. III. 30 617/2012/6); BDT2008. 1767 (Szegedi Ítélőtábla: Gf. I. 30.099/2006); EBH2011. 
2417 (Legf. Bír. Pfv. X. 21.462/2011).
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of creditors, the statutory presumption supporting the claimants’ case and the 
modest litigation costs.
However, if we have a look at the substantially different nature of the case law, 
it becomes apparent that this may not follow from the differences of the statutory 
provisions. As we have seen, while English directors are normally found liable 
where they have acted irresponsibly, in Hungary courts tend to hold directors 
personally liable when an element of fraudulence in a wide sense can be detected. 
At the first sight, it may seem a paradox that the caseload is more substantial 
in Hungary despite the higher threshold of misconduct (fraudulence instead of 
irresponsibility). However, the real reason behind this phenomenon is probably 
different. It appears, that the provisions on the personal liability of directors for 
wrongful trading, imported by Hungary back in 2006 with no ancestors in the 
Hungarian law, have found their place in the Hungarian legal system covering 
a wider circle of misconduct and incorporating actions which would fall within 
the scope of other actions in England, first of all that of the fraudulent trading 
or misfeasance.143 This demonstrates that the transfer of certain legal institutions 
from one country to another without having regard to the wider context of the 
legal systems, however successful they are, does not necessarily result in legal 
harmonisation. Perhaps the term “legal naturalisation” may be more appropriate 
to describe the story of the liability for wrongful trading in Hungary.
143 See above note 24.
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